Quoting relevant parts of the rather long older quote for context and convenience of readers, with numbers and formatting added:
Quote:
Originally Posted by Poitive 1) Nations decisions in international politics are about harsh solid practicality, and not about emotions and help. .....
2) IMO, the need of Indian defence isn't limited to China and Pakistan. Be weak enough and all sorts of adversaries would show up, as it would be viable for them to bully us. How countries deal with us would change; from the weaker ones to the US, all would change. It is said that the best way to safeguard peace is to be well prepared for war.
.....
3) Other related thoughts:- Russia openly going all for China at the cost of India, would push India towards the US. Not favourable for Russia.
- China going after us hammer and tongs would again push India towards the US. If pushed enough, we might have to accept US bases in India. Bad for China.
- US pushes us beyond a point, we end up leaning towards the Russia-China grouping, even if it means some compromises.
- In an ideal world, we would not want to have trouble in our immediate neighbourhood and be on good terms with China, whether or not the border is defined (as of now it is in China's interest to keep the border unclear), however peace between India and China is not in the US interest, as it combines two major emerging powers (at different stages though), which in times to come would be a counterweight to the US; more so when combined with Russia.
4) As before, gaming of scenarios is done for long periods (a 100+ years) and a peaceful border of India and China, with them spending less on defence and more on economic growth and being able to combine forces to take on others is not in the interest of current centres of global power, and rarely talked about on media - mainstream or social. |
Quote:
Originally Posted by Samurai This is a very unlikely scenario. I am surprised you would even think this. |
I suppose the last part of the post (marked (4) in the quote above) was quite missed.
It is not about things actually happening so with a high likelihood, but about how scenarios are gamed based on alignment of interests at a broad, and especially narrow level. Let me put it more simply for a wider audience; it is a bit like:
* If country A initiates action a1, how would country B react?
* A series of possible scenarios are worked out. Say b1, b2, b3 ...
* Based on those scenarios, one would consider how other countries might react to the situation at each stage, which would lead to further scenarios. Say a1-b1-c1..., a1-b1-c2, a1-b1-c3 ..., a1-b2-c1..., a1-b2-c2..., a1-b2-c3..., a1-b3-c1 and so on.
* The above is highly simplistic based on 3 variables of 3 countries. It could be worked out at numerous levels and reactions of each country and even each relevant leader of each country. Further possible influences to each leader could be added. It keeps getting more and more complex.
So, in the above example, if County A (China) acts on Country B (India) it would incentivize country B (India) to seek the support of country C (USA/West/Quad/etc). Country C would look at it's interests to make it's decisions based on it's own evaluation of the situation (not just military but on all fronts, including internal politics). Based on C's reaction to B, country A might not initiate the initial action at all.
While A (China) acting on B (India) might not happen, the relevance of considering C (USA etc) in the scenario should really not be missed.
It is really about pressure points and counter pressure points between countries/country groupings (and individuals/collective's interests). To not consider them in international politics and gaming of war situations would not be wise. Much of international politics is really based on that.
~~~~~
A note on US bases across the world:
The US has interests to have bases across much of the world, especially close to it's potential adversaries. Now, how does it sell the idea to a sovereign country to have bases on their soil being in the interest of the country?
- The said country needs to have a big enough perception of threat from it's adversary.
- It needs to find the US (or it's grouping) to be the most viable counter-measure to that threat.
- There can be many other points of individual leaders being settled with etc, but I'll not go there (it isn't even much relevant to the current discussion).
IMO, the perception of threat has effectively been worked upon across much of Europe/Eastern-Europe (not suggesting that the threat was imaginary).
~~~
Further, India feeling significantly threatened by China works in the interest of the US - potential (not likely) US bases in the region. Let that point not be missed (refer to 4 in the quote).
China realizing this, and it's fallout eventually working against China's interest, reduces the practical viability of China going hammer and tongs after us (even though the US might be happy if it did - to break any chances of a future Russia-China-India axis). So the very idea of their action
potential bases in India, reduces the chances of them going hammer and tongs after India.
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Originally Posted by Samurai This is not a tennis match where the superior player will win and everyone goes home. |
I agree. Of course it isn't, and saw no reason for it to be considered as a tennis or other match.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Samurai Yet somehow it is assumed that No.3 military in the world would try to invade no.4 military and that the latter would be desperate enough accept US bases. |
It really is not assumed. It is
factored into the possible scenarios to
consider potential pressure points while
gaming future scenarios.
To not even consider how interests and potential reactions might be, is also a bit like ignoring Nuclear Deterrence and even the whole of the Cold War. Decades spanned, huge expenses borne, the world on it's edge. In proportion, little actually happened on the ground.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Samurai Thanks to Ukraine invasion, US & West have exposed their cards. China is watching how US & West is helping a white European country under invasion by powerful nuclear neighbor. The help is limited to sanctions, harsh words and arms/money supply to the victim. That means if China invades a certain non-white asian island, the reaction will be even less. Sure, Taiwan can turn into a poison pill and give tough time to China. But they don't have to be afraid of sanctions at all. Heck, even when we were fighting China in 2020, we were importing huge from China. Even enemies of China can't afford to ban Chinese imports. |
Quite an agreeable perspective on how things have unfolded till now, and likely to be correct. However much more might unfold over time. The lovely post by
Fuldagap here clarifies much, including a very realistic threat from China (Army No 1, 2, 3 eventually has limited meaning as mentioned in one of the posts: US and USSR leaving Afghanistan).
Another perspective could also be that other countries are seeing the 'cost of not being in NATO'. Sharing such a large border with Russia, it might increase the perception of threat to reconsider joining NATO. The counter threat of Russia taking them on would of course also need to be considered. (Had talked about one of the aims of Russia in this war would be to give messages to other countries.)
Edit:
Wanted to reply to
Fuldagap 's lovely post (
link), but not doing so as beyond a point, Indo-China might be seen as too much off topic. I do agree with most of what is said in that post.