Hi everyone,
Two sides to each coin and I'm here to share the viewpoint of a VC (bonus is I fit the infamous archetype haha: young; IIT --> consultant --> investment professional).
Crash-and-burn stories:
1) As someone that had a chance to look at a lot of such edtech deals (the likes of Byju’s, which grew on the back of India’s desperate clutch on education as the only path to socio-economic uplift, selling dreams while loading customers with loans), I agree that there is no world in which predatory selling tactics are fair. But how is this any different from offline coaching behemoths selling dreams and inviting thousands of kids each year to the dingy confines of a small town in the western part of the country? Knowing that only the top few batches would see maybe an upper limit of 50% success, while the bottom 70% of the batches would see <10% success?
2) I happened to have spent time on one of the healthcare companies (that faked numbers) referenced in this thread at some point. I (with my close-to-nil experience in the real business world) couldn’t reconcile basic math on customer acquisition costs against the monthly P&L sheet. Additionally, there was too much of a gap between fair value and the ask on share price - one which there was no data on operating metrics to use to make a case for. For the above 2 reasons, I passed on the opportunity. Did 99% of 10 investors who looked at the company do the same? Yes. Did the 1% who ended up investing mess up? Yes, and more on the ‘why’ later.
Quote:
Originally Posted by v1p3r The other issue is that most Indian VCs have very little actual P/L experience. Most of them come from some sort of consulting background, or were mid-managers in the 2000s. They're armed with the right IIx / NRI credentials, and not much else. Asking someone who has never run a business in their life to judge people running businesses, is like asking me to rate the pain of menstrual cramps vs pregnancy. |
Here's a take on what a board at any company should have – the founders who’ve got an understanding of the problem at hand and how they wish to solve for it, and in addition, people added for benefits beyond that – capital, operational expertise, network, etc. Would you not agree that the ideal investor is one that sees the opportunity as the founder does, lets them do what they do best in the day-to-day and does their job as a sounding board and chief criticizer to ensure that shareholder value is maximized? Venture is a business of selection much more than stewardship and investors are significantly happier to just stay out of day-to-day business, while consistently keeping an eye out for risks, market feedback and other viewpoints that the founders in the thick of things might miss.
Do investors that have run P&Ls prior have significant ability to understand risks to call out and help founders in navigating them? Yes
Do investors without such P&L experience have a similar ability? Yes, in a lot of cases. I’ve heard arguments and seen in experience that a non-operator investor has the ability to zoom out of the day-to-day and be ruthless with what the numbers are saying (which is what the next-stage investor or a public markets investor would look at and hence is a direct driver of shareholder value growth).
Coming back to the topic of the 1% of investors who did mess up, referenced above - Why did the frequency of such events in the startup ecosystem go up drastically in the last 2 years?
I’d urge you to think of the venture industry as a separate ecosystem outside of the startups that they invest in. Capital injection the US economy (the largest source of capital for the Indian private spheres) saw historic highs in 2021, 2021. Supply and demand characteristics of the private markets went for a toss - more capital chasing startups --> founders with higher bargaining power --> competition among investors to invest in the same cos (rather than the investor choosing the asset, the asset started choosing the investor here). Process discipline (diligence, fair pricing) went for a toss and as a result, 2 things happened –
i) the turbo spooled on the natural selection process (death by lack of value creation). There were far higher # of companies folding as substandard business plans had been funded.
ii) Bad actors, under pressure of delivering, resorted to unethical practices
When a bank loosens its underwriting criteria and disburses loans to riskier borrowers, they're making an informed decision hoping that the growth in interest revenue outweighs the increase in NPAs. This is no different to a VC firm loosening its purse strings in an upward cycle, that 1 company missed out on because you were too slow in making an investment offer due to diligence is a far bigger loss than 5 other substandard / soon-to-be-fraudulent companies that you lost money.
This happened globally, but localizing it to the India situation – this harms the health of the ecosystem. We are lucky to hopefully ride this out on account of having tailwinds in the form of money that was erstwhile going to China coming to India. But this has to serve as a lesson for all stakeholders – if this happens in the next upward cycle (one where India’s exit maturity – ability to actually create liquid exists – would finally come under full question), we are doomed.
Capital and businesses are going to remain involved in this natural supply-demand ebbs and flows, but what the ecosystem needs to take from this is recognition of the nature of this sector in terms of its risk profile. Working at a startup needs to be thought of very differently from working at an MNC / traditional organization. The risk-return profile here is different (it’s in fact very different at different stages of a startup too) – and we need to talk about this far and wide. When you’re joining an early stage startup, you’re signing up for significantly higher risk in return for a hopeful payout if things go right (statistics are against you here as only a very small % of new startups raise the next round). Similarly, at a growth stage startup (think one that has raised >$10M), there is lower risk but it's there and it’s significantly higher than a lot of other jobs. Investors know that 80% of their investments are going to go bust, the ecosystem needs to factor that in too while choosing which places to work at.
Happy to hear feedback or counter arguments, because there's really no right answer here and no one brush to paint it all with.