Re: Missing! AirAsia's Indonesia to Singapore Flight QZ8501 What I read from other friends reg Air Asia Indonesia 8501 etc http://www.availableaircraft.co.uk/I..._-_Issue_1.pdf
Possibly what happened in Taiwan.
and in the air indonesia case http://www.pprune.org/8853717-post3069.html
"pilots apparently familiar with the A320 suggesting that a combination of thrust moment, auto fly to G, mode of readouts, lack of pilot SS feedback, narrow speed margin, warning chaos, and possible rapidity of AOA change in relatively rare turbulence, not to mention pilot error (however small) and confusion over what the control system is thinking could ALL have contributed to two accidents where a stall all the way from altitude to impact occurred. There are more recently some hints (and counter opinion) that, once stalled, the A320 control system might actually be attempting to hold the plane in a stall."
(from a friend)
For a concerned layman like me there are possibly many pilots who are the equivalent of programmers who cannot fathom pointers because all they get taught is java. Sadly not knowing how to fly is a lot scarier ! They rely on auto-modes, because that is SOP, and when thrown into a situation where they have to fly, have no knowledge, training or experience to recover.
Scary as hell i say - i'm happy i only fly twice in six weeks now and not the 80 odd annual flights I took for the last two and a half year.
AF447 - the pilots whose errors crashed the plane had 9000+ hours between them! Yet they didn't recognize the stall as it developed! http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...er-struck.html
and a recent near-miss in Australia: http://avherald.com/h?article=47196b94 Quote:
On Jun 17th 2014 the ATSB released their final bulletin releasing the safety message:
This incident provides a reminder to pilots of all aircraft types regarding the potential for an aerodynamic stall. The stall occurs at a critical angle of attack. The airspeed associated with the stall angle of attack varies depending on the aircraft weight and load factor (such as angle of bank), and the configuration of flaps, slats and spoilers.
The Golden Rules for Pilots article in Safety First - The Airbus Safety Magazine, Issue 15, January 2013, states that on highly automated and integrated aircraft, several levels of automation are available to perform a given task; and the ‘appropriate’ level of automation depends on the situation and task. It advises flight crew to understand the implication of the intended level of automation. Being able to anticipate the reaction of the automated response is important in deciding whether to proceed to rule 4 and change the level of automation.
In this incident, understanding the automated response to a potential overspeed situation may have given the first officer more time to analyse and resolve the situation. Disconnecting the autopilot and autothrust led to a rapid increase in workload and the aircraft changing from a potential overspeed to a slow speed state.
Here's what the timely arrival of the captain does:
The aircraft began to descend and the airspeed dropped to below the lowest speed that autothrust would permit to select. The first officer applied nose up commands in order to level at FL380 and moved the thrust levers back close to but not to idle position, which reduced the maximum thrust available from the engines. The nose up inputs increased the angle of attack beyond the alpha floor, the alpha floor protection activated, the speed brakes were automatically retracted and the TOGA lock was activated.
At that time the captain returned to the cockpit, scanned the primary instruments, noticed the aircraft pitch at 0 degrees, the speed in the yellow band about half way between stall and lowest selectable speed, the speed trend accelerating and the aircraft at FL365. There were no indications of any other aircraft in the vicinity that could have been affected by the altitude busts, the captain spotted the Thrust Lock indication. The captain took control of the aircraft, double clicked the autothrust disconnect button to disengage the thrust lock and moved the thrust levers to the climb detent, noticed the speed brake lever was extended and moved it to the retracted position, set a pitch attitude of about +5 to +7 degrees corresponding to a climb of 700-1000 fpm.
ATC noticed the aircraft was now below FL380 and queried to confirm the altitude again, the first officer radioed they were now climbing to FL380, operations were normal.
The captain, cognisant of a gentle recovery to avoid a secondary flight envelope event, levelled the aircraft at FL380 and re-engaged automation.
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Last edited by phamilyman : 5th February 2015 at 10:40.
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