Interesting thread. I would certainly have liked to Thank a number of the posters here - maybe we should consider that for Shifting Gears as well.
Some thoughts. Exchange Rates are fundamentally determined by the balance between Capital Flows and Current Account Flows. Changes in both of these reflect the competitiveness of economies - so your exchange rate is a messenger, telling you how you are doing. Of course like all market based messengers, it is not perfect - it is influenced by sentiment, and may over or under react.
When I started my career in the mid 1990s (and I have been a consultant or banker throughout my career ), we used to work with an assumption that the INR would depreciate by 5% p.a. against the USD every year. Why? 10% inflation in India, 2% in the USA and a 3% real appreciation of the INR due to India becoming richer (poor countries need exchange rates that are undervalued on a purchasing power parity, or PPP, basis - and as they become richer, the exchange rates converge towards PPP). If you look at the movements of the INR, this held all the way from the start of liberalisation till 2000, when the exchange rate hit INR 49 or 50 per USD. But then, the INR reversed - and appreciated to INR 45 per USD and stayed there for a decade.
Why did this happen? Two reasons. The hard work done through the late 1990s to reduce deficits and inflation paid off, and inflation expectations for India moved down to 4-5% from 10%, which implied a flat nominal exchange rate based on the above formula. And the opening up of the economy across sectors, plus PSU divestment (strategic sale of PSUs, not dribbling stock into the market) + the BRICs report made people think that India was the next China and attracted foreign investment here. Reducing inflation meant that the Current Account Deficit (CAD) was stable or reducing (also aided by the boom in IT exports after Indian companies proved themselves during the Y2K scare), and Capital Flows too turned positive.
So what went wrong? A typical Indian trait - patting oneself on ones back and thinking that the war is won as soon as the first skirmish is over. We bought the BRICs hype, and decided we could do whatever we feel like and continue to grow. Unproductive Government expenditure sky rocketed driven by the 6th Pay Commission, which massively increased pay for government servants, the bank loan waivers, NREGA, the stimulus post the 2008 Global Crisis and a massive increase in corruption. The attitude of the bureaucracy went back to the bad old ways - where they thought that they are doing businessmen a favour by letting them invest in India. Cases like the Vodafone tax case, and even more ridiculous cases against Shell, Nokia et al have made India a bad word in board rooms around the world. Think the iron ore export ban or revoking mining lease allocations to companies like Vedanta after they invested billions.
Net result, inflation between 2008 and 2012 has averaged 8-9% p.a., at a time when global inflation has been less than 1% p.a. That would imply a need for 4-5% depreciation in the INR over this period. But amazingly, the INR was stable till mid 2011 - perhaps because markets thought that this increase in inflation was a blip (and due to the capital flows arising from the feeling that the West was dead post crisis, and BRICs were the place to be). The Indian economy became uncompetitive, and the CAD rose - to 5% of GDP. The current crash in the INR is a necessary correction and will make our economy more competitive. However, whether this is sustained depends on investor confidence - whether they invest to tap opportunities arising from the depreciation, or think that dealing with our politicians and bureaucrats is not worth the hassle. Unfortunately, the behaviour of our government does not seem to have changed - look at how barring a lone Yashwant Sinha, no one has the guts to say that passing the Food Security Bill in such a economic environment is lunacy of the highest order, or how the Ministry of Health is hell bent on driving out investors in the pharma sector.
The RBIs ham handed actions have not helped either. They drew a line at Rs. 60 per USD even though they did not have the resources to defend it, keep blaming speculators, and have imposed ham handed capital controls. Eg., only USD 1.2 billion left India under the USD 200,000 remittance scheme. That implies just 6000 people used that limit. The RBI reduced the limit to USD 75000. If even 16,000 people use this lower limit, remittances would be the same. But these controls on domestic investors have created a sense of panic, got FIIs to pull out, made NRIs delay remittances to India to wait and see where the INR settles, and perhaps would induce more people to open foreign accounts and use the USD 75 k limit. After all, for most of us, USD 300 k for a family of 4 is more than our total savings - and the risk that more people start using this limit is enormous.
So where will the INR settle? If the GOI mends its ways, the fall in the INR is probably over-done. But my advise would be to hedge - aim to move 40-50% of your savings out of the country. |