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Originally Posted by NiInJa I want to understand possible reasons why plane did not catch fire in this incident. |
Excellent question. I think the links below are self explanatory.
https://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Post_Crash_Fires https://www.total.co.uk/ultimate-gui...-aviation-fuel
Quoted from the second link above -
At normal temperatures, aviation fuel gives off very little vapour. This means it doesn’t ignite easily and or form dangerous fuel-air mixtures. JET-A1, also has a flash point higher than 38˚C – crucial, as it makes the fuel less likely to combust unsafely.
The weather report issued by Calicut Airport around the time of the accident mentions a light westerly wind, visibility of 2000m, light rain, scattered clouds at 300ft above the airport and overcast skies at 8000ft above the airport, the ground temperature was 24deg Celsius, dew point of 23deg Celsius with a pressure of 1009 hectopascals. Additionally, there would be temporary periods of deteriorating visibility, reducing up to 1500m with light rain & mist.
In my opinion, the temperature at the airport was well below the flashpoint of Avtur. I don’t know how much of fuel did leak out from the fuel tanks/engine pylons but the survivors can be extremely thankful that there weren’t any sparks during the crash sequence.
The B737 aeroplane itself doesn’t have any post crash fire mitigation systems. It does have extinguishing agent to fight fires in the engines, the auxiliary power unit (APU), the cargo bays & the lavatories. However except the lavatory, all other extinguishing agents need to be discharged manually from the cockpit.
I hope that answers your question.
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Originally Posted by KiloAlpha I am just speculating here, but maybe the aircraft just failed to gain lift due to the fact that commercial pilots don't really practice touch-and-go procedures, and hence just could not execute it correctly in the 737-800. No doubt, the captain would surely have known how to do it in a MiG-21. But then, every aircraft is different. |
I won’t compare this accident to the Emirates accident which you have linked because I believe that, from that accident report, that accident was more to do with automation dependence & mode confusion, together with some other contributing factors which created a deadly concoction of errors for all the reasons listed in that accident report. However what turned that incident into an accident was the pilot flying’s (Captain in that instance) lack of physically advancing the throttles after commanding the Auto-throttle system to go-around (increase engine thrust). What saved the lives of all on board was the fact that he flew a perfectly stable approach to the runway & went around as soon as he realised that the approach was getting unstable (not forcing/salvaging a landing & eating up precious runway). Also the fact that the aeroplane impacted the smooth runway surface itself and not elsewhere. As a result, the fuselage stayed intact.
Coming back to this accident in Calicut (Emirates too), I think what you are referring to, in Boeing nomenclature, is called a ‘Go-Around after Touchdown’. From my company B737 FCTM - attached below
The green highlighted text, it clearly tells us (the flight crew) to continue with normal go around procedures.
The red highlighted text, it’s self explanatory.
What this accident crew really did in the final minutes of the flight, the data recorder will tell us. Why they did what they did, the voice recorder & the accident report (conclusively) will tell us. However, with what evidence is available to us as of today, the actions/decisions of the PIC are extremely questionable, to say the least.
Regarding how often do we practice touch & go landings, at least at my operator, the answer is none, after we have completed the aircraft type rating/base training. And it is a manoeuvre which needs a check & training captain in the left seat and a safety pilot in the jumpseat. However, during everyday operations, it’s never used. Our goal is to fly a stabilised approach & safe touchdown. If anything doesn’t go to plan during the approach, we try to correct it ASAP. If unable, we are trained to go around immediately.
During our regular pilot proficiency check, our performance is evaluated by the government regulator certified, company simulator examiner to satisfactorily deal with various emergencies and land the aircraft safely following ALL procedures laid down by the aircraft manufacturer & company SOP.
With the accident PIC’s vast experience, his competence in operating the B737 is NOT in question. I am SURE he was fully capable of flying this aeroplane to the edge of its envelope. It’s a very easy airplane to fly for an average customer like me. However, in my opinion, why he didn’t have the situational awareness to foresee the consequences of his actions, I don’t know. And more importantly, what was the First Officer doing (assuming he was the pilot monitoring on this sector)? It would be illogical if the Captain didn’t assume control, if the FO was flying this approach. I predict Crew Resource Management (CRM) & Human Factors are going to be MASSIVE in the AAIB’s accident report.