[Sutripta]

Originally Posted by Hayek

More shit hits the fan for Boeing.
...

Details here:

https://www.ft.com/content/000bba0e-...e-4367d8281195

The FT article is behind a paywall.
One should be able to get a couple of peeks at the NYT article.

Regards
Sutripta

[HappyWheels]

Originally Posted by Sutripta

The FT article is behind a paywall.
One should be able to get a couple of peeks at the NYT article.

Regards
Sutripta

Or WP

https://www.washingtonpost.com/local...732_story.html

[fhdowntheline]

One of the pilots stating “ no one told us ..” referring to the MCAS behaviour is an even more damning situation in my view. The test pilots were unaware of the flying control augmentation ? And they were expected to sign off on the performance?

[V.Narayan]

Originally Posted by fhdowntheline

That may be a politically correct statement, but the reality is that Airbus stands to gain from any misstep by Boeing, and vice-versa. Most likely not. But going by the current Max disclosures, it will definitely try to discreetly clean up its act in terms of design/testing and related compliances.

No doubt Airbus will be discreetly double checking everything. But where co-operation on flight safety goes the view from the tarmac or cockpit is one of unselfish co-operation amongst aviation entities (airlines, operators, MRO etc) with each other in terms of lending expertise, spares, tools, personnel etc in times of a crises or difficulty and this is often done with minimal or no commercial consideration. I don't know if other industries have this practice.

Originally Posted by Hayek

More shit hits the fan for Boeing. The Chief Test pilot seems to have faced “crazy” runaway trim on a simulator while the plane was being certified.

Originally Posted by Sutripta

The FT article is behind a paywall.
One should be able to get a couple of peeks at the

Originally Posted by fhdowntheline

One of the pilots stating “ no one told us ..” referring to the MCAS behaviour is an even more damning situation in my view. The test pilots were unaware of the flying control augmentation ? And they were expected to sign off on the performance?

Not trying to do the politically incorrect thing of trying to defend Boeing. But where testing is considered it is done over thousands flight hours on the simulator and in real life. One statement can be easily positioned out of context as we don't know what happened (or did not happen) as a consequence of his feedback. While I have understandably never tested a prototype of an OEM I have participated in several flight tests of second hand purchases or maiden flights off the production line or aircrafts after a major upgrade/modification of some sort and a lot of things get discussed and cursed over. It seems the same test pilot gave the all clear later on. It will be interesting to know what pressure was brought to bear on him or what corrections (inadequate in hindsight) were made after his feedback.

[Sutripta]

^^^
Found it strange that no one (Boeing apologists?) highlights the fact that these comments were made while 'flying' a simulator. In which case then current thought might have held simulator setup/ programming at fault, not the aircraft.

However to me what is important is not so much someone pointing out that the MCAS is acting up, but of a system wide culture of ignoring anything inconvenient, anything which was likely to affect the MAX rollout timeline, and which could be said to be rare/ exceptional.*

As I have said before, one man's testimony by itself is just that - one man's testimony. But with time we are seeing a pattern emerging. Originally just suspected, a working hypothesis. But gradually now being collaborated by multiple sources.

* It is these rare and unusual events which have to be investigated very very thoroughly. Because these are unexpected. Which means ones understanding of the system is incomplete at best, faulty at worst. This is true across all of science and engineering. It is not that we will come up with breakthroughs every time. But to ignore it is to ask for trouble.

Regards
Sutripta

[Jeroen]

Agree. Then again this is probably the most credible witness to come forward yet.

What is amazing that apparently MCAS disappeared from the manual by just one text from him to the FAA?!

What happened in the SIM is really critical as well, but as with other testimonies lacks detail to make any sense.

If anything it appears Boeing did do some testing. Till now it was not clear if MCAS had been tested at all, let alone be tested rigorously in non normal situations.

Here is one of their own test pilots who appeared to be surprised by it. Of course the question whether the SIM was set up properly to simulate MCAS remains unanswered. Neither do we really know what kind of testing / verification went on when this happened. Part of testing is of course verifying and fine tuning the design. All sorts of things go wrong during testing. They get fixed through updates in the design, procedure etc.

As far as I understand MCAS: when it kicks in when it was supposed to, it reduce force needed on the yoke and therefore also reduces the need for a lot of trimming.

The trimming problems were part of the scenario that contributed to the two crashes, due to the AoA issue which led to MCAS operating when it should not.

This pilot talks about having to trim a lot to counter MCAS effects. Were they simulating some non normal situation? Or were they just verifying the normal operation? Were design changes made afterwards or not?

Either way, this guy appears to be saying that with hindsight he believes he might have been lying earlier on. And somehow felt compelled to do so, in order to get the Max certified. Which is a huge thing, irrespective of what happened in the SIM.

Jeroen

[Jeroen]

A somewhat different view on this Max thing. Customers have done substantial down payments. All of that sits as a liability in Boeing books. They need to start delivering these planes soon.

Boeing Faces $33 Billion Sword Of Damocles https://seekingalpha.com/article/429...sword-damocles

[Sutripta]

^^^
That site/ blog is of course a guide for investors. How professional I have absolutely no way of knowing. But the people who comment (I normally make it a point of going through the comments section if there is one, of any new to me site because I feel it gives a better insight into what quality one can expect from that site) don't come across as being professional.

Regards
Sutripta

[Jeroen]

I find these sort of investor guides very different from the ones I subscribe to in Europe. Many more people appear to invest in stock in the USA as in Europe. Many of them do so privately and rely on the internet for information. It does mean there is information in abundance and it comes in many different shapes and formats with a wider range of comments as I would see in Europe. At least that is my impression.

So quite a bit is written and presented in a more loose way compared to others. Which also makes it more accessible to a wider audience.
The information in this article is pretty factual and all from public sources. This is just stuff that Boeing publishes.

What he does not touch upon to what extend advance payments have stopped for Boeing and if so when. Irrespective, it is a huge liability way above what they could pay of themselves. I am not sure how much of provisions they have already taken to offset any claims they will be facing.

I am not a hundred percent sure how that works for Boeing. On the one hand they need to be prudent and transparent, but I am not sure at what moment they can actually take provisions. And more importantly, how they would calculate it. They must be able to make a calculation based on the T&Cs they signed up for per contract.

Irrespective of the exact details, the only way out for Boeing is to get these planes certified and start delivering them.

Jeroen

[BoneCollector]

Saw these series of Tweets on my TL and reading through it surprises me how the 737 was designed! The pages are worth reading.

Boeing 737-100


Boeing 737-300


Boeing 737-700


Boeing 737-MAX

These illustrations also show the design evolution of the 737 over years.

[Sutripta]

https://www.wsj.com/articles/europea...ne-11571692941

Regards
Sutripta

[Jeroen]

Somehow I am not surprised. My impression was that In the past, other regulators would more or less follow whatever the FAA decided. FAA was considered to be the ultimate authority in the aviation industry.

This really shows how deeply the rest of the world is distrusting the FAA due to this MAX certification fiasco.

Other regulators are not going to align themselves with the FAA anymore. They are going to make up their own mind. Anybody’s guess on how much of that is political or real. Probably a fair bit of both.

We are in a state where no regulator can back up any FAA ruling, advise, certification. It is not a pretty picture that is emerging. Every new bit of insight that has emerged over the last weeks and months puts them deeper in the hole it seems.

Can we sue the FAA for being so stupid? This one is going down as a classic how long it will take to build a reputation and how quickly you can loose it. next year MBAs will have this as a case study.

Trust is one of the most precious commodities on our world. Difficult to come by, easy to loose.

Jeroen

[Sutripta]

Originally Posted by Jeroen

Anybody’s guess on how much of that is political or real. Probably a fair bit of both.

I think one side will see it as a safety/ engineering issue, the other as a politically inspired witchhunt.

We are in a state where no regulator can back up any FAA ruling, advise, certification. It is not a pretty picture that is emerging. Every new bit of insight that has emerged over the last weeks and months puts them deeper in the hole it seems.

This was a very real possibility when facts on the coziness between the FAA and Boeing started emerging. Yet everyone thought that somehow it would not come to this.
The cost to the aviation world is going to be significant. And yet this seems almost certain to happen. Wonder at what point one (or both) the parties decided this far and no further. And what were those hard boundary lines.
Wonder which of EASAs five conditions the FAA balked on.

Can we sue the FAA for being so stupid?

Can one sue people for dreadful(ly stupid) marriage choices?
The FAA is now trying to play the victim/ jilted lover/ marriage under false pretentions card - we were not informed blah blah. Fact is FAA and Boeing were a secretly married couple, and now they have been outed, the marriage has gone sour.
You really believe that NOBODY in the FAA knew about the MCAS, and that it was a cause for concern.
I think that at some point (immediately would be too chaotic) the FAA needs to be disbanded and a new organisation built up to take on its work and mandate. A new start is going to be quicker, and with less baggage, than FAAs trying to get back its reputation. If the current impasse is seen by the others as the result of FAAs intransigence, it is not going to get back the trust it has lost.


Regards
Sutripta

[Jeroen]

Originally Posted by Sutripta

You really believe that NOBODY in the FAA knew about the MCAS, and that it was a cause for concern.

It is hard to believe that nobody at FAA was aware of MCAS. If that was the case that makes the whole situation even more serious. And since the texting of Boeing's Test Pilot we also know that the FAA was not only aware of MCAS, they actually agreed to to take all references out of the Aircraft Operating Manual!!

The final report on Lion Air is due to be released this Friday, but some insights are trickling out to the public. (partly because the involved families got an update prior to the formal release)

There are three contributing factors to the crash:
- Inherent design flaw in MCAS
- pilot error, inconsistent communication, (which probably also mean did not adhere to protocol)
- Maintenance error on the AoA sensor.

Most media is jumping only on the Boeing/FAA/MCAS angle. But as I have been saying all along, the other elements are just as relevant and deserve proper attention and follow up.

Let there be no mistake, MCAS design was massively flawed. Still the industry does need to come up with a good answer what the appropriate level of pilot skills is. How to measure/test/validate/certify it. How to ensure that you design a plane that can be flown, with some type training, by regular air crews?

Jeroen

Jeroen

[Sutripta]

Indonesian report: - lots of articles all over the place. But where is the actual report?

Regards
Sutripta